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The Haunting of Her House: How
Virginia Law Punishes Women Who
Become Mothers Through Rape
Jordan S. Miceli*
Abstract
If a rape victim becomes pregnant following the attack, she
has three options: abort the pregnancy, place the child for
adoption, or keep and raise the child. However, by requiring
proof of conviction of rape to terminate the parental rights of the
man who fathered that child through his rape, the
Commonwealth of Virginia imposes a substantial burden on a
victim weighing those options. To obtain a conviction under the
current scheme, a victim, through her local prosecutor, has to
prove to a jury that the accused committed the rape beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth requires proof of
conviction in custody proceedings and adoption proceedings,
punishing both the victim mother who chooses to carry the
pregnancy to term and the child born of rape. Although
termination of parental rights is a civil matter, the
Commonwealth currently imposes a criminal standard of proof
on victim mothers.
Thus, this Note urges the adoption of the clear and
convincing evidence standard in such termination proceedings.
The current scheme debilitates a victim mother unable to secure
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advice and mentorship that helped shape this Note. Special thanks also to
Professor Alexandra Klein, and to the editors of the Washington and Lee Law
Review for their guidance. I would also like to thank my family and friends for
their love and support in law school and in life. Finally, this Note is dedicated
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129

130

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 129 (2021)

a conviction against her rapist due to the unique and complex
nature of the crime. The Commonwealth leaves the victim with
no real choice in the matter: either abort the pregnancy and be
free of her attacker forever, or carry the pregnancy to term and
live in fear that her rapist will assert his parental rights over the
child. The adoption of the clear and convincing evidence
standard will help alleviate the life-altering harm facing a
mother and child, and will ensure that all parties are given equal
treatment under the law.
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INTRODUCTION

Every sixty-eight seconds someone is raped in the United
States,1 resulting in approximately 25,000 to 32,000 unintended
pregnancies each year.2 In 2003, Analyn Megison was
twenty-nine years old when she was brutally raped in her
home.3 Following the attack, she discovered she was pregnant4
1. Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L
NETWORK, https://perma.cc/J5MC-HYBS (applying a five-year rolling average
to adjust for changes in the year-to-year National Crime Victimization Survey
data). For more information, see RACHEL E. MORGAN & ALEXANDRA THOMPSON,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2020,
(2021), https://perma.cc/L4SN-6Z4V (PDF).
2. H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).
3. See Liz Fields, These Women Became Pregnant From Rape, Then
Fought Their Attackers for Custody, VICE NEWS (Dec. 1, 2014, 3:35 PM),
https://perma.cc/6RG4-AHEY (explaining that Megison, a law school graduate,
was beaten and raped until she fell unconscious in her home in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana).
4. Id.
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and decided to carry the pregnancy to term.5 She then spent two
years in court fighting her rapist for custody of her daughter.6
In 2008, Tiffany was twelve years old when Christopher
Mirasolo kidnapped and raped her.7 She became pregnant as a
result of the rape and chose to keep and raise the child as her
own.8 Her rapist pled guilty to third-degree criminal sexual
assault, but when Tiffany applied for state medical assistance,
a Michigan state trial court judge signed an order granting her
rapist joint legal custody of the child.9 Although the order has
since been rescinded, Tiffany was forced to cope with a situation
in which her son would be placed in the care of her rapist.10 In
2011, eighteen-year-old Noemi Martinez was raped by her
coworker.11 In the aftermath, she realized she was pregnant.12
Her rapist was charged with first-degree sexual assault but pled
down to third-degree sexual assault.13 Five months after Noemi

5. See id. (“People she turned to for help immediately pressured her to
abort or put her baby up for adoption. She resisted . . . .”).
6. See id. (explaining that after two years “in and out of courtrooms, her
rapist eventually dropped his custody case”).
7. Woman Whose Rapist Was Granted Joint Custody of Child Speaks
Out, CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://perma.cc/AMK5-SC7C
(explaining how Tiffany, who asked to be identified only by her first name, was
raped by Mirasolo in an “abandoned house near Detroit”).
8. See id. (quoting Tiffany as saying “I have been taking care of [my son]
for eight years. I gave up high school, I gave up prom, I gave up my friends to
raise a baby and go to work”).
9. See id. (“Sanilac County prosecuting attorney James V. Young and
Judge Ross signed a paternity order that gives Tiffany’s attacker joint legal
custody of their son and the right to pursue parenting time.”).
10. See Mark Martindale, Judge, Prosecutor Vow Changes Over Custody,
Rape Case, THE DETROIT NEWS, https://perma.cc/L92M-LWYJ (last updated
Oct. 17, 2017, 11:15 PM) (“During a brief hearing, Judge Gregory Ross
rescinded his . . . decision that granted parental rights to sex offender
Christopher Mirasolo, while county [p]rosecutor James Young apologized ‘for
the manner in which this case was handled.’”).
11. See Thom Patterson, ‘I Have to Text My Rapist’: Victims Forced to
Parent With Attackers, CNN HEALTH (Nov. 18, 2016 7:36 AM),
https://perma.cc/4VCM-CTL7 (explaining that Noemi was in high school when
her coworker invited her over to his house and raped her).
12. Id.
13. See id. (“Under Nebraska law, Noemi could terminate her attacker’s
parental rights if he’d been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. But
because he was convicted of third-degree sexual assault, his parental rights
were safe.”).
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gave birth, her rapist demanded visitation with the child.14 He
won unsupervised visits with the child, and Noemi now has to
give her child over to her rapist on a regular basis.15
Pregnant rape victims16 have three options: terminate the
pregnancy, place the child for adoption, or keep and raise the
child. In the Commonwealth of Virginia, if a rape victim chooses
to keep and raise a child conceived through rape or place it for
adoption, her rapist may, under Virginia law, attempt to assert
his parental rights over that child.17 Unless a court or jury finds
the father guilty of the crime of rape beyond a reasonable doubt,
Virginia law deems him a viable parent—a person with a
legitimate interest18—and he has all of the rights associated
with that parentage.19 The Commonwealth’s statutory
framework forces women who become pregnant through rape to
make an extraordinarily difficult decision: abort the pregnancy,
removing the risk of her attacker reentering her life or choose to
put the child up for adoption or raise the child as her own and
face the risk that her unindicted rapist will assert his parental
rights over the child.

14. Id.
15. See id. (“Setting up visits between her child and her attacker has
become an emotionally difficult part of daily life. ‘Now I have to text my rapist
or email my rapist,’ [Noemi] said. ‘To leave my daughter with someone I didn’t
trust.’”).
16. This Note uses “victim” instead of “survivor” to refer to those women
who endure the crime of rape. The term “victim” in the criminal justice system
describes a person that has been subjected to a crime and denotes a legal
status, and is not meant to imply weakness, guilt, or blame. See VICTIM OR
SURVIVOR: TERMINOLOGY FROM INVESTIGATION THROUGH PROSECUTION, SEXUAL
ASSAULT KIT INITIATIVE 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/4V2Q-VGN5 (PDF).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021)
“Person with legitimate interest” shall be broadly construed and includes,
but is not limited to, grandparents, step-grandparents, stepparents, former
stepparents, blood relatives and family members provided any such party
has intervened in the suit or is otherwise properly before the court. A party
with a legitimate interest shall not include any person (i) whose parental
rights have been terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily . . . or (iii)
who has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 . . . or an
equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign
jurisdiction, when the child who is the subject of the petition was conceived
as a result of such violation. (emphasis added)

18.
19.

Id.
See infra Part III.
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This reality is alarming at best and punishing at worst.
Decisions regarding a pregnancy via rape should lie solely with
the victim mother, without apprehension that she might be
required to raise a child alongside her rapist. Requiring proof of
a rape conviction in order to establish that rapist father has no
legitimate interest in the child is vindictive. Family law
proceedings are civil matters; employing the criminal standard
of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil proceeding is
particularly severe, given that the standard of proof for all other
necessary conditions to terminate parental rights20 is clear and
convincing evidence.21
Consequently, this Note urges the adoption of the clear and
convincing evidence standard in termination proceedings when
the father conceived the child through his rape. The clear and
convincing evidence standard survives constitutional challenges
while ensuring that the victim can adequately protect herself
and her child absent the rare rape conviction.
Part II provides a background on the crime of rape and its
physical and psychological effects. Part III explores parental
rights and family law procedures controlling issues of child
custody in the Commonwealth. Part III further explains the
potentially devastating effects that the Commonwealth’s family
law framework may have on a victim mother and child if her
attacker is found not guilty of rape. Part IV explains the legal
procedures surrounding abortion, while Part V outlines the
procedures for adoption in the Commonwealth. Finally, Part VI
argues that the current conviction requirement is unduly
punishing and examines the clear and convincing evidence
20. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (2021). See infra Part III.A.1 for an
explanation of termination of parental rights.
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B) (2021) (explaining the conditions to
be proved by clear and convincing evidence for termination surrounding
neglect and abuse that led to foster care placement); § 16.1-283(C) (explaining
the conditions to be proved by clear and convincing evidence for termination
when the parent or parents have failed to maintain contact with the child or
have failed to remedy the conditions that led to the foster care placement);
§ 16.1-283(D) (explaining the conditions to be proved by clear and convincing
evidence for termination surrounding abandonment that led to foster care
placement); § 16.1-283(E) (explaining that residual parental rights may be
terminated for children in the custody of local board or child-placing agencies
when the parent has been convicted of listed offenses and the victim was a
child). All residual parental rights termination decisions are made after
considering the best interests of the child. See infra Part III.B.2.
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standard and the constitutional considerations that accompany
it. Part VI additionally reflects on the federal government’s
support of the clear and convincing evidence standard in
termination proceedings, provides framework examples from
two states that employ the clear and convincing evidence
standard for terminating a rapist’s parental rights, and suggests
new statutory language for the Virginia General Assembly to
consider and adopt.
The Commonwealth of Virginia should prioritize protecting
both parties and is currently failing to protect women who
become pregnant as a result of rape. The decision to abort, place
for adoption, or keep and raise a child conceived through rape is
one that should be left with the victim. As the law currently
stands, the Commonwealth of Virginia further violates the
victim by inflicting needless and avoidable pain and suffering.
This proposed solution ensures that a victim mother has the safe
and secure option to do what is best for her and her child.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Defining the Violent Crime of Rape

is
defined
in
Virginia
as
“sexual
Rape22
intercourse . . . against a complaining witness’s will by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or
another person.”23 With a male perpetrator and a female victim,
Virginia courts interpret “sexual intercourse” to mean “actual
penetration to some extent of the male sexual organ into the
female sexual organ.”24 “Complaining witness” means the
22. This Note analyzes the crime of rape in a stranger- and
acquaintance-rape context, in which the rapist and the victim were not in a
legally recognized relationship at the time of the attack. Marital rape and the
family law presumptions that accompany it are outside the scope of this Note.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2021).
If any person has sexual intercourse with a complaining witness, whether
or not his or her spouse, or causes a complaining witness, whether or not his
or her spouse, to engage in sexual intercourse with any other person and
such act is accomplished (i) against the complaining witness’s will, by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another
person . . . he or she shall be guilty of rape.

24. Carter v. Commonwealth, 428 S.E.2d 34, 41 (Va. Ct. App. 1993); see
also Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 543 S.E.2d 631, 637 (Va. Ct. App. 2001)
(“Penetration by a penis of a vagina is an essential element of the crime of
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person alleged to have been subjected to the crime of rape.25
Sexual intercourse is “against a complaining witness’s will”
when there is “some array or show of force in form sufficient to
overcome resistance.”26 A victim does not need to have
physically fought against her attacker, but some evidence of a
lack of consent is necessary.27
To satisfy the element of force, the evidence must establish
that the act was “effected . . . without the victim’s consent.”28 In
the absence of force, rape can be effectuated through either
threat or intimidation.29 Threat is understood as “an expression
of an intention to do bodily harm.”30 Intimidation does not
require an express threat by the attacker to commit bodily
harm,31 but instead requires “putting a victim in fear of bodily
harm by exercising such domination and control of her as to
overcome her mind and overbear her will.”32
rape; proof of penetration, however slight the entry may be, is sufficient.”
(citation omitted)).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10 (2021) (“‘Complaining witness’ means
the person alleged to have been subjected to rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate
or animate object sexual penetration, marital sexual assault, aggravated
sexual battery, or sexual battery.”) While rape is a crime that affects all
persons regardless of gender, this Note is limited to the male perpetrator and
female victim dynamic due to the focus on pregnancy.
26. Sabol v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
27. Id.
28. Gonzales v. Commonwealth, 611 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
(explaining that “the use of force is shown by the act of non-consensual
intercourse itself”).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2021); see also Myers v. Commonwealth,
400 S.E.2d 803, 804–06 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that submission out of
fear on the part of the victim and the lack of force demonstrated by the
assailant leading up to and during the sexual intercourse did not mean that
the assailant had not raped the victim).
30. Sutton v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665, 670 (Va. 1985).
31. Sabol, 553 S.E.2d at 537 (explaining that this “fear of bodily harm
must derive from some conduct or statement of the accused”); Lunceford v.
Commonwealth, No. 1234-15-1, 2016 WL 6208632, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
2016) (stating that intimidation is distinct from threat because “the fear of
bodily harm can arise from the imposition of psychological pressure on one
who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure”
(citation omitted)).
32. See Sutton, 324 S.E.2d at 670 (explaining that the evidence presented
in the case supported a finding of intimidation, given the threat by the
defendant to return the victim to her father, who physically abused her);
Breeden v. Commonwealth, 596 S.E.2d 563, 568 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (stating
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Rape is an abominable crime, “both in a moral sense and in
its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and
autonomy of the female victim and for the latter’s privilege of
choosing those with whom intimate relationships are
established.”33 Short of homicide, it is the “ultimate violation of
self.”34 Even though rape is understood to be a uniquely violent35
and punishable crime,36 it is one of the few crimes where justice
is rarely served.37
B.

Systematic Underreporting, Under-Prosecution, and
Under-Conviction

In contrast with other violent crimes, the majority of rapes
are not reported to the police.38 There are various reasons39 that
that intimidation was established in addition to force because the accused was
in possession of a firearm throughout the assault, threatened to kill himself
with the firearm, and created “the implicit threat that he would use more force
and violence if she did not comply with his wishes”).
33. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
34. Id.
35. See Aisha Nicole Davis, Intersectionality and International Law:
Recognizing Complex Identities on the Global Stage, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205,
239 (2015) (“Rape is a unique crime in that the impact of rape extends beyond
the physical trauma associated with the initial assault.” (citation omitted));
Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at
One Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 44
(1995) (“To label rape as merely assault denies the reality of what rape, as
opposed to other physical assaults, does—rape is an objectification and denial
of the basic humanity of the victim.”).
36. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (“Rape is without doubt deserving of
serious punishment . . . .”); Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley,
Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape
Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 146 (2001) (“[M]ost state laws currently
impose substantial penalties for rape, and most citizens consider it second only
to homicide in terms of its heinousness.”).
37. See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST
NAT’L NETWORK, https://perma.cc/M56D-N8CQ (“Out of every 1,000 sexual
assaults, 975 perpetrators will walk free.”).
38. See id. (“Only 310 out of every 1,000 sexual assaults are reported to
the police. That means more than 2 out of 3 go unreported.”); see also MORGAN
& THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that in 2019, 33.9 percent of rapes or
sexual assaults were reported to the police, while in 2020, that figure dropped
to 22.9 percent).
39. See MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010, at 7 (2013),
https://perma.cc/M5Z7-JSQ2 (PDF) (providing multiple reasons for
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may influence a victim’s decision to forego reporting the rape to
law enforcement, such as the fear of reprisal,40 the belief that
the police will not do anything to help,41 or the fear of not being
believed.42 Moreover, myths about rape and women who are
raped—that the victim was asking to be raped because of the
way she was dressed,43 that she is making it up,44 or that she is
otherwise to blame for the rape because of her conduct45—are
still widely expressed and accepted in modern society.46
Consequently, a victim might choose not to report due to the
harmful rhetoric that accompanies those myths.47 Victims also

non-reporting, including the victim believing the rape to be a personal matter,
believing the incident to not be important enough to report to police, and not
wanting to get the offender in trouble).
40. See id. (explaining that the most common reason victims gave for not
reporting the crime during 2005–2010 was fear of reprisal).
41. MORGAN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 7 (including rape with other
violent crimes that were not reported to the police out of a fear that law
enforcement “would not or could not” provide assistance).
42. See Malinda L. Seymore, Attorney-Client Sex: A Feminist Critique of
the Absence of Regulation, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 182 (2003) (“When
asked why she did not report the attorney, she indicated that no one would
believe her, as it was her word against his, and that if anyone believed her, no
one would care . . . .”).
43. Holly Boux, “If You Wouldn’t Have Been There That Night, None of
This Would Have Happened to You”: Rape Myth Usage in the American
Judiciary, 40 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 237, 253 (2019).
44. See, e.g., Kimberly Peterson, Note, Victim or Villain?: The Effects of
Rape Culture and Rape Myths on Justice for Rape Victims, 53 VAL. U. L. REV.
467, 475 (2019) (identifying the myth that “victims often lie about being raped”
as one of the most prominent misconceptions about rape, and stating that in
fact, “the percentage of false rape allegations is no higher than the percentage
of false reports of other felonies”).
45. See Carol L. Zeiner, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of
Government’s Directives on Student to Student Campus Rape, 47 J.L. & EDUC.
427, 450 (2018) (“What did she expect if she went into a bedroom with him
alone? She should not have gone to [a bar alone, that particular party, that
neighborhood, that parking garage].” (citation omitted)).
46. See Boux, supra note 43, at 244 (explaining that the rape myth frame
has “dominated public discourse on violence against women for decades”);
Donald A. Dripps, Why Rape Should Be a Federal Crime, 60 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1685, 1690 (2019) (describing rape myths as “deeply embedded social
attitudes”).
47. See Peterson, supra note 44, at 490 (“Rape culture is also the cause of
the low reporting rate because it makes the victim feel as if she is to blame,
which leads her to forego reporting her rape.”).
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choose not to report out of fear of vilification by defense
counsel—a fear that is not unfounded.48
When rape is reported to law enforcement, the incident is
seldom referred to a prosecutor.49 Because police officers are
generally skeptical when presented with a rape complaint,50
they may fail to adequately investigate the complaint.51 In the
rare instance that a rape is referred for prosecution, a police
officer’s skepticism directly affects a prosecutor’s decision as to
whether or not to pursue the case: if there is no investigation,
there is nothing for the prosecutor to work with.52 The decision
to prosecute or not “generally rests entirely in his discretion,”53
which may be influenced by a variety of outside factors.54
48.

See CHANEL MILLER, KNOW MY NAME 341–42 (2019).

Instead of his attorney saying, Did you notice any abrasions? He said, You
didn’t notice any abrasions, right? This was a game of strategy, as if I could
be tricked out of my own worth. . . . I was pummeled with narrowed, pointed
questions that dissected my personal life, love life, past life, family life,
inane questions accumulating trivial details to try and find an excuse for
this guy who had me half naked before even bothering to ask for my name.

49. Victoria Brown et al., Rape & Sexual Assault, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
367, 375 (2020) (“Less than ten percent of rapes reported to police will be
referred to a prosecutor.”).
50. See Lisa Avalos, Prosecuting Rape Victims While Rapists Run Free:
The Consequences of Police Failure to Investigate Sex Crimes in Britain and
the United States, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8 (2016) (stating that there are
“unduly high levels of skepticism toward rape complainants” seen among
police officers and that rape complainants “were regularly disbelieved”).
51. See Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and
Investigate Rape Cases: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (“[I]t is clear that we are
seeing chronic and systematic patterns of police refusing to accept cases for
investigation, misclassifying cases to non-criminal categories so that
investigations do not occur, and ‘unfounding’ complaints by determining that
women are lying about being sexually assaulted.”).
52. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1, 42 (2015) (“[P]olice have increasingly acted as gatekeepers to
inhibit rape victims from pushing their cases forward.”).
53. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (explaining
that as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe “that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute,” the decision is then subject to his or
her discretion).
54. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-4.4 (4th ed. 2015)
(listing proper considerations in exercising discretion to “initiate, decline, or
dismiss a criminal charge” as the strength of the evidence, the nature of the
crime, the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense, and the views and
motives of the victim).
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Prosecutors’ reservations about the convictability of rape
often lead them to file charges only when the evidence is strong,
the suspect is at fault, and the victim is blameless.55 However,
the reality of rape is much more complex than the standard it is
held to by the criminal justice system. As a result, the
evidentiary issues that often accompany the crime56 lead
prosecutors to decline taking on cases that are not as clear.57
Relying on evidence that is founded in a “he said, she said”
context to prove the offense of rape to a judge or jury is a lofty
task. Moreover, high conviction rates are important to
prosecutors and many are loath to take a case that may
jeopardize their success.58 Finally, the myths and stereotypes
surrounding rape and rape victims influence prosecutors as
much as they do society, directly impacting their assessment of
the viability of the complaint.59
Due to the overall under-prosecution of rape, rape
convictions are infrequent.60 Even if a prosecutor does decide to
prosecute a rape case, a conviction is still hard to achieve.

55. CASSIA C. SPOHN ET AL., NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REF. SERV., PROSECUTORS’
CHARGING DECISION IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 42 (2002),
https://perma.cc/3DRD-6AHJ (PDF).
56. See Heather R. Hlavka & Sameena Mulla, “That’s How She Talks”:
Animating Text Message Evidence in the Sexual Assault Trial, 52 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 401, 401–02 (2018) (“An oft invoked trope in cases of sexual violence, ‘he
said, she said,’ suggests that without third-party witness testimony or
material evidence, sexual assault allegations rest on conflicting reports
provided by victims and alleged perpetrators.”); Yung, supra note 52, at 37
(“Rape cases, whether prosecuted or not, usually amount to competing
narratives about events for which there is no documentary evidence.”).
57. See SPOHN ET AL., supra note 55, at 54–66 (outlining the reasons
behind a prosecutor’s decision not to file charges, including inferences about
the victim, typifications of “rape-relevant” behavior, and a determination that
ulterior motives were at play).
58. Yung, supra note 52, at 42.
59. See Bradley A. Muhs, Fighting the Unfair Fight: Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder and the Need for Neuroimaging Evidence in Rape Trials, 35
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 215, 219 (2014) (“Prosecutors will often misapply these
myths when deciding on whether to bring a case against a suspected rapist,
thereby leading to prosecutorial hesitance to file charges when the alleged
victim does not conform to society’s misplaced perception of the ‘innocent’
victim.”).
60. See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST
NAT’L NETWORK, https://perma.cc/M56D-N8CQ (stating that twenty-eight out
of every 1,000 sexual assaults cases will lead to a felony conviction).
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Because rape is a criminal offense, it is subject to the most
stringent standard of proof: beyond a reasonable doubt.61 In
order to obtain a rape conviction at trial in Virginia, the
prosecution must prove each element of the crime to the
required standard.62 Due to the complexities of rape, this is often
challenging,63 especially if the only two witnesses to the assault
were the victim and the accused rapist. When a rape case results
in a question of who is more believable—him or her—the task of
proving that the accused rapist committed the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt is incredibly arduous.
Convictions at trial are less likely in rape cases than any
other violent crime.64 Juries are often suspicious of victims who
do not immediately report the rape or seem emotionally
unbothered at trial.65 Jurors are also less likely to believe the
victim if she was intoxicated at the time of the assault.66 These
factors and others influence the jury’s understanding and
analysis of the case and can lead to reasonable doubt as to the
accused’s guilt.67 As a result, a jury may find the accused not

61. See Crawford v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 107, 120 (Va. 2011)
(“Because of the stringent standard of proof the law imposes upon the
prosecution, juries must acquit unless they find each of the crime charged to
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
62. See id. (“[T]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim; (2) that it was
against her will and without her consent; and (3) that it was by force, threat
or intimidation.”).
63. See Rachael Kessler, Note, Due Process and Legislation Designed to
Restrict the Rights of Rapist Fathers, 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 199, 218 (2015)
(“In many rape cases, it is difficult for a prosecutor to present enough evidence
to support a jury finding that the rape occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
64. See Yung, supra note 52, at 42 (explaining that “[a] typical rape case
can fall apart at any stage through the criminal justice system,” contributing
to low conviction rates).
65. Emily Pedersen, The New Rape: Proposal of a Comprehensive Rape
Law Reform to Increase Convictions in Cases of Acquaintance Rape, 84 UMKC
L. REV. 1111, 1118–19 (2016).
66.
See Kellie Rose Lynch et al., Who Bought the Drinks? Juror
Perceptions of Intoxication in a Rape Trial, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
3205, 3207 (2013) (“[I]f a sexual assault case with an intoxicated victim
reaches court, research has shown that mock jurors and jurors view the victim
as less credible and more responsible for the assault compared with a
nonintoxicated victim.”).
67. See Pedersen, supra note 65, at 1119 (stating that jurors exhibited
bias against victims who did not physically resist the assault, who put
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guilty, and leave the victim with no further recourse in the
criminal justice system.
Understanding
that
rape
is
underreported,
under-prosecuted, and vastly under-convicted, it is alarming
that Virginia conditions the termination of an alleged rapist’s
parental rights on a criminal conviction. With the reality of
devastatingly low conviction rates for rape, employing a
criminal burden of proof in a civil family law proceeding results
in a near-impossible barrier for a victim mother to overcome
when seeking to protect herself and her child from her rapist.
C.

The Statistical Reality of Rape and its Impact

Rape is an insidious and pervasive crime. Hundreds of
thousands of people are raped in the United States every year.68
One out of every six women is the victim of an attempted or
completed rape in her lifetime.69 Young women are particularly
vulnerable to rape, experiencing the crime at troublingly high
rates when compared to the general population.70
In addition to the physical harm that accompanies rape,71
victims of the crime often suffer considerable emotional and
mental trauma.72 Rape victims are “particularly vulnerable” to
themselves in a vulnerable position, were around “dangerous” people, and who
had had consensual sexual histories).
68. See MORGAN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 2 (reporting that the
number of rapes and sexual assaults was 734,630 in 2018, 459,310 in 2019,
and 319,950 in 2020).
69. Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L
NETWORK, https://perma.cc/2RGZ-7SNX.
70. See Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L
NETWORK, https://perma.cc/J5MC-HYBS (stating that women between the
ages of sixteen and nineteen are four times more likely than the general
population to be victims of sexual violence and women ages eighteen to
twenty-four who are college students are three times more likely to experience
sexual violence than women in general).
71. See Terri Weaver & Heidi Resnick, Impact of Violence Against Women
on Their Physical Health, NAT’L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION RSCH.
CTR. (2000), https://perma.cc/S6AN-T5SA (listing genital tearing, bruising,
lacerations, and abrasions among the reported physical harms suffered during
rape); Sexually Transmitted Infections, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://perma.cc/7X6Q-49LU (explaining that sexually transmitted infections
may be transmitted through nonconsensual sexual contact).
72. See Christopher C. Kendall, Rape as a Violent Crime in Aid of
Racketeering Activity, 34 L. & PSYCH. REV. 91, 106 (2010) (stating that the
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developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the wake of
their attack.73 Victims who suffer from PTSD often relive the
rape in their minds, exhibit detachment from others to create
distance between themselves and the attack, and feel restricted
in their ability to express positive emotions.74 In addition to the
likely onset of PTSD, a rape victim may suffer from additional
phobias,
anxieties,
depressive
symptoms,
and
obsessive-compulsive tendencies.75 Moreover, rape victims are
more likely to have suicidal ideations and abuse drugs and
alcohol following the attack.76
Stemming from the fact that rape is a high-frequency crime,
rape-related pregnancy is a problematic possibility.77 While
some have posited that “legitimate” rape78 does not result in the
conception of a child,79 a basic understanding of the crime
harm that victims endure is physical, in addition to the equally painful
psychological and emotional harm).
73. 12 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 401 (2021) (explaining that rape
victims often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder because the assault is
often sudden and leaves the victim defenseless, the assault may be
intentionally cruel, the victim may feel trapped, and the assault often involves
physical harm).
74. See Kendall, supra note 72, at 109–11.
75. Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A
Discussion and Analysis of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women
Who Become Mothers Through Rape, 98 GEO. L.J. 827, 834 (2010).
76. See Dean G. Kilpatrick, The Mental Health Impact of Rape, NAT’L
VIOLENCE
AGAINST
WOMEN
PREVENTION
RSCH.
CTR.
(2000),
https://perma.cc/MZ76-7G42 (finding that 33 percent of rape victims said yes
when asked if they ever thought seriously about committing suicide, and are
twenty-six times more likely to have two or more serious drug problems than
women who had never been victims of a crime).
77. KATHLEEN C. BASILE ET AL., HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RAPE-RELATED
PREGNANCY AND ASSOCIATION WITH REPRODUCTIVE COERCION IN THE U.S. 5
(2019), https://perma.cc/W8YH-YRWN (PDF) (noting that among the
approximately eighteen million women that had experienced vaginal rape in
their lifetime, 2.9 million reported rape-related pregnancy).
78. See Charlotte Alter, Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s Wrong With
Saying Legitimate Rape, TIME (July 17, 2014, 4:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/QSB2-NT8C (reporting the harmful position put forth by
former Representative Todd Akin that “legitimate rape” encompasses only
those cases in which “[a] woman calls a police station, the police investigate,
she says ‘I’ve been raped,’ [and] they investigate that”).
79. See Lori Moore, Rep. Todd Akin: The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/5T9L-WFJE (reporting former
Representative Todd Akin, Republican from Missouri, as saying “[i]f it’s a
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refutes that claim.80 Because the incident of rape is typically
unreported, calculations of how many women become pregnant
as a result of rape are likely incomplete.81 A frequently cited
study has estimated that the rate of rape-related pregnancy is
approximately five percent per rape victim.82 According to the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, this
percentage rate amounts to “approximately 32,000 pregnancies
resulting from rape each year.”83
Because it is difficult to calculate how many rape-related
pregnancies occur each year, it is even harder to accurately
track the outcomes of such pregnancies.84 Though many women
who become pregnant from rape choose to terminate the
pregnancy,85 it is estimated that anywhere from 32.3 percent86
to 73 percent of women choose to carry their pregnancies to

legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut the whole thing
down”); Associated Press, Lawmaker Says Rape Can’t Cause Pregnancy,
SFGATE, https://perma.cc/NEE9-A2DQ (last updated Feb. 4, 2012, 4:57 PM)
(reporting Henry Aldridge, Republican member of the North Carolina House
of Representatives, as saying “[t]he facts show that people who are raped—
who are truly raped—the juices don’t flow, the body functions don’t work and
they don’t get pregnant” during a House debate on abortion funding in 1995).
80. See supra Part II.A; see also Sharon Begley & Susan Heavey, Rape
Trauma as Barrier to Pregnancy has No Scientific Basis, REUTERS (Aug. 20,
2012, 7:58 PM), https://perma.cc/8WLE-BRQJ (quoting Dr. Barbara Levy as
saying “[a] woman who is raped at a vulnerable time in her menstrual cycle is
as likely to conceive and retain a pregnancy as a woman who was voluntarily
attempting pregnancy”).
81. See Moriah Silver, The Second Rape: Legal Options for Rape
Survivors to Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM. L.Q. 515, 520 (2014)
(“Unfortunately, due to the severe underreporting of rape . . . these statistics
are likely drastic underestimates of the number of women who experience a
rape-induced pregnancy.”).
82. See Melissa M. Holmes et al., Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and
Descriptive Characteristics From a National Sample of Women, 178 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 323 (1996) (explaining that this rate applies
to women of reproductive age, which is between the ages of twelve and
forty-five years old).
83. COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, SEXUAL ASSAULT
297 (2019), https://perma.cc/CG29-4RW5 (PDF).
84. See Prewitt, supra note 75, at 829.
85. See id. (stating that approximately 26 percent to 50 percent of “women
faced with rape-related pregnancies” seek abortions).
86. See Holmes et al., supra note 82, at 322.
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term.87 From there, somewhere between 32.3 percent and 64
percent of women decide to keep and raise the child.88
III. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW IMPLICATIONS
A.

An Explanation of Parental Rights

Parental rights are a person’s authority to make all
decisions concerning his or her child. This includes the right to
determine the child’s care and custody,89 the right to educate the
child,90 to raise the child in a certain religion,91 and other
general decisions influencing the upbringing of children.92
Parental rights are constitutionally protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,93 and are among
the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the
courts.94 Accordingly, courts are hesitant to intervene in what is
frequently understood to be a uniquely private realm.95

87. AMY SOBIE & DAVID C. REARDON, VICTIMS AND VICTORS 19 (2000).
88. See Brown et al., supra note 49, at 430.
89. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (stating the
“interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
child” is vital).
90. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (finding that an Oregon statute requiring children
to attend public schools for primary education “unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control”).
91. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (“[T]he values of
parental direction of the religious upbringing . . . in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society.”).
92. See id. at 232 (“This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 583, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence
historically reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
broad parental authority over minor children.”).
93. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to establish a
home and bring up children”).
94. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
95. See id. at 58 (“[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability
to make the best decisions regarding their children.”).
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However, parental rights are not absolute. The United
States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Prince v.
Massachusetts,96 a seminal parental rights case:
Against these sacred private interests, basic in a
democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the welfare
of children, and the state’s assertion of authority to that end,
made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things
were involved. The last is no mere corporate concern of official
authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and
given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens.97
Thus, the state retains an interest as parens patriae98 in the
children that reside within its borders. This interest often
manifests itself when the state seeks to “guard the general
interest in the youth’s well-being.”99 In addition to other factors
that can trigger a state’s power as parens patriae,100 in
termination proceedings, the state’s goal centers around
ensuring the child is as stable as possible. If there is a “reason
to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships
exist, the parens patriae interest favors preservation, not
severance, of natural familial bonds.”101 In Virginia, “[t]he
common law doctrine of parens patriae is defined as that power
of the Commonwealth to watch over the interests of those who
are incapable of protecting themselves.”102 This concept informs
a Virginia court’s understanding and analysis of any child
custody issue that may come before it.

96. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
97. Id. at 165.
98. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (explaining that the
state’s parens patriae interest concerning children lies in “preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child”). A state’s parens patriae interest most
obviously culminates in the maintenance of state-run child-care institutions.
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993).
99. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
100. See id. (listing required school attendance and regulated or prohibited
child labor as ways the state can restrict the parent’s control over the child
when the child’s wellbeing is at stake).
101. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67.
102. Verrocchio v. Verrocchio, 429 S.E.2d 482, 485 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
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Termination of Parental Rights in Virginia

Parental rights may be terminated. In the Commonwealth
of Virginia, termination of parental rights is termination of
residual parental rights, which is understood as the rights and
responsibilities remaining with the parent after the transfer of
legal custody or guardianship.103 Simply put, a parent retains
residual parental rights even when the child is not physically in
the custody of the parent and the parent has no control over the
day-to-day decisions impacting the child’s life, unless the
juvenile and domestic relations general district court terminates
those rights.104
Termination of parental rights is an irreversible105 and
grave action, and thus must be conditioned on more “than a
difference in values, morality, or parental philosophy.”106 If a
court orders termination, the connection between the parent
and child is severed forever, and the parent in effect becomes a
legal stranger to the child.107
Section 16.1-283 provides for the termination of residual
parental rights under carefully defined, but broad,
circumstances.108 Circumstances warranting termination
include child abuse or neglect or the risk of abuse or neglect,
abandonment, if the parent or custodian is unable to provide
parental care or guardianship by reason of physical or mental
incapacity, or if the parent or custodian has been convicted of a
listed offense and the victim of the offense was a child.109 In
order to terminate residual parental rights, there must be clear
and convincing evidence of both a qualifying circumstance and
that termination is in the best interests of the child.110 While

103. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2021) (explaining that the rights include,
but are not limited to, “the right of visitation, consent to adoption, the right to
determine religious affiliation and the responsibility for support”).
104. See infra Part III.B.1 for an explanation of child custody definitions
and determinations.
105. Ange v. York/Poquoson Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 560 S.E.2d 474, 482 (Va.
Ct. App. 2002).
106. PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., VA. PRAC. FAMILY LAW § 14.3 (2020 ed.).
107. Ange, 569 S.E.2d at 482.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (2021).
109. See id. §§ 16.1-283(B)–(E).
110. Id.
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termination of residual rights occurs most frequently in foster
care placements and adoptions,111 a court may terminate the
residual parental rights of one parent without affecting the
rights of the other parent.112
B.

Child Custody and Custody Proceedings in Virginia
1.

Forms of Custody Recognized in Virginia

When faced with a dispute concerning the custody of a child,
a Virginia court will consider and decide legal and physical
custody, and whether such custody will be joint or sole.113 Legal
custody is the responsibility for the care and control of the child
and the authority to make decisions concerning the child.114 This
includes healthcare, education, and any other decisions that
would majorly impact the child’s upbringing.115 Physical custody
is the responsibility for the physical and custodial care of the
child.116
Joint legal custody is defined as both parents having a
shared responsibility for the care and control of the child, and
shared authority to make decisions concerning the child, even if
the child primarily resides with just one parent.117 If joint legal
custody is awarded and the child is placed in the primary
physical care of one parent, the noncustodial parent is typically
awarded visitation.118 Joint physical custody means both
111. See infra Part V for an explanation of the legal procedures controlling
adoption.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (2021).
113. Id. § 20-124.2(B).
114. See In re O’Neil, 446 S.E.2d 475, 478 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
115. See id. at 478
In this Commonwealth, “legal custody” is defined as the right to have
physical [charge] of the child, to determine and redetermine where and with
whom [the child] shall live, the right and duty to protect, train and discipline
[the child] and to provide [the child] food, shelter, education and ordinary
medical care. (citation omitted)

116. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021).
117. Id.
118. See Vissicchio v. Vissicchio, 498 S.E.2d 425, 431–32 (Va. Ct. App.
1998) (stating that ordering visitation to the father for one-quarter of the
child’s time in addition to alternate holidays was within the discretion of the
trial court, and that the arrangement was beneficial to the child having a
primary residence or base).

THE HAUNTING OF HER HOUSE

149

parents share physical and custodial care of the child.119 Joint
physical custody often results in the child spending
approximately half of their time physically with both parents—
alternating weeks between each parent’s home, for example.120
With sole custody, one parent retains responsibility for the care
and control of a child, and has primary decision-making
authority.121
While there is a controlling statutory mandate that a court
is not to prefer one form of custody over another,122 joint legal
custody arrangements are awarded with relative frequency and
ease.123 The Virginia General Assembly has expressed support
of joint custody, encouraging courts to “assure minor children of
frequent and continuing contact with both parents, when
appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the
responsibilities of rearing their children.”124
2.

Best Interests of the Child Standard

In determining custody, the court must give primary
consideration to the best interests of the child.125 The best
interests of the child standard is the “lodestar” for the court in
child custody decisions involving conflicting parental

119. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021).
120. See In re Long, No. CJ05CH-1743, 2006 WL 2022000, at *1 (Va. Cir.
Ct. May 31, 2006) (awarding joint physical custody based on an “alternate
week schedule,” which would “include weekends by the parent taking the child
on Friday sometime after school until the following Friday after school, when
the other parent would take charge for the ensuing week”).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021).
122. See id. § 20-124.2(A) (“The court shall consider and may award joint
legal, joint physical, or sole custody, and there shall be no presumption in favor
of any form of custody.” (emphasis added)).
123. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 834 S.E.2d 473, 475–76 (Va. Ct. App.
2019) (upholding an award of joint legal custody with visitation rights for
mother in light of the parties’ complete inability to communicate and the
presence of a protective order barring contact); Thomas v. Thomas, No.
2421-97-4, 1998 WL 201562, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1998) (upholding an
award of joint legal custody despite past physical altercations between the
parents, an acknowledged inability to effectively communicate, and a history
of alcohol and drug abuse on the part of the father).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2021).
125. Id.
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interests,126 and the concerns and rights of the parents must be
tempered by this standard.127 However, “[p]arental rights of
custody are founded upon the strong presumption that the best
interests of the child will be served by placing it in the custody
of its natural parents.”128
The best interests of the child standard controls in every
decision concerning the custody of a child, including legal
custody, physical custody, visitation, termination of parental
rights, and potential modification claims. In Virginia, there are
ten statutory factors that a court must consider when analyzing
the “best interests of the child” in a given custody proceeding:129
1. The age and physical and mental condition of the child,
giving due consideration to the child’s changing
developmental needs;
2. The age and physical and mental condition of each parent;
3. The relationship existing between each parent and each
child, giving due consideration to the positive involvement
with the child’s life, the ability to accurately assess and meet
the emotional, intellectual, and physical needs of the child;
4. The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other
important relationships of the child, including but not
limited to siblings, peers, and extended family members;
5. The role that each parent has played and will play in the
future, in the upbringing and care of the child;
6. The propensity of each parent to actively support the
child’s contact and relationship with the other parent,
including whether a parent has unreasonably denied the
other parent access to or visitation with the child;
7. The relative willingness and demonstrated ability of each
parent to maintain a close and continuing relationship with
the child, and the ability of each parent to cooperate in and
resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the child;
8. The reasonably preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age,
and experience to express such a preference;
126. Roberts v. Roberts, 586 S.E.2d 290, 295 (2003) (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
127. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (“[W]hile the
legal rights of a parent should be respected in a custody proceeding, those
technical rights may be disregarded if demanded by the interests of the
child.”).
128. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 336 (Va. Ct. App.
2006).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2021).
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9. Any history of (i) family abuse as that term is defined in
§ 16.1-228; (ii) sexual abuse; (iii) child abuse; or (iv) an act of
violence, force, or threat as defined in § 19.2-152.7:1 that
occurred no earlier than 10 years prior to the date a petition
is filed. If the court finds such history or act, the court may
disregard the factors in subdivision 6; and
10. Such other factors as the court deems necessary and
proper to the determination.

Failure to consider all of the statutory factors for
determining the best interests of the child in a child custody
proceeding is reversible error.130 A court presented with a
custody case between a victim mother and rapist father will
likely give the most weight to those factors that focus on the
relationship between the parties131 and their relative parental
abilities.132 The sixth133 and seventh134 factors present the most
concern with a victim mother, who would likely seek to place as
much distance as possible between her and her rapist.
3.

Modification of Child Custody Decrees: Material Change in
Circumstances

Child custody and visitation rulings are never final,135 and
are subject to judicial review upon a showing of a material
change of circumstances.136 The Supreme Court of Virginia
established a two-part test for modification of child custody
decrees in Keel v. Keel.137 The test asks whether there has been
a change in circumstances since the most recent custody award,
and whether a change in custody would be in the best interests
130. Piatt v. Piatt, 499 S.E.2d 567, 571 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
131. VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-124.3(6), (7) (2021).
132. Id. §§ 20-124.3(2), (3), (5), (9).
133. See id. § 20-124.3(6) (“The propensity of each parent to actively
support the child’s contact and relationship with the other parent, including
whether a parent has unreasonably denied the other parent access to or
visitation with the child”) (emphasis added).
134. See id. § 20-124.3(7) (“The relative willingness and demonstrated
ability of each parent to maintain a close and continuing relationship with the
child, and the ability of each parent to cooperate in and resolve disputes
regarding matters affecting the child” (emphasis added)).
135. Roberts, 586 S.E.2d at 295.
136. Id.
137. 303 S.E.2d 917 (Va. 1983).
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of the child.138 This two-part test is the relied upon standard for
modification in the Commonwealth.139
The first prong of the test—whether there has been a
change in circumstances—is not limited to “whether negative
events have arisen at the home of the custodial parent.”140 A
change in circumstances that could warrant the modification of
a custody decree is “broad,” and can include a myriad of
considerations, including positive ones.141 The second prong
invokes the aforementioned best interests of the child standard,
which remains paramount.142 Because the child’s best interests
are vital, this second prong is “clearly the most important part
of the two-part test.”143
In a custody modification case, the court’s primary goal is
to determine which home will be best for the child.144 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has expressed its understanding of
“best” to be:
[N]ot necessarily . . . the most expensive home, or the one
with the prettiest furnishings, or the one with the greatest
number of “creature comforts.” For we are firmly of the view
that a house is not a home, that a home is more than bricks
and mortar. “Best” to us is the home that will provide the

138. Id. at 921.
139. See Rhodes v. Lang, 791 S.E.2d 744, 747 (Va. Ct. App. 2016) (“When
a party has filed a petition to modify an existing visitation order, the courts
must apply the [Virginia] Supreme Court’s two-prong test enunciated in Keel
v. Keel to determine whether modification of that order is proper.” (citation
omitted)); see also Sizov v. Sizov, No. 1704-19-4, 2020 WL 7222171, at *6 (Va.
Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2020) (relying on the two-part test in determining whether a
change in custody was warranted); Munoz v. Quinones, No. 1834-18-4, 2019
WL 1441228, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2019) (same).
140. See Keel, 303 S.E.2d at 921.
141. See id. (explaining that a change in circumstances can include
changes “involving the children themselves,” and is broad enough to include
positive changes, “such as remarriage, and the creation of a stable home
environment, increased ability to provide emotional and financial support for
the children”).
142. See id. (“[D]espite changes in circumstances, there can be no change
in custody unless such change will be in the best interests of the children.”).
143. Id.
144. See id. (“The overall aim of a court in a change of custody case must
be to determine which home is ‘best’ for the children.”).
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children the greatest opportunity to fulfill their potential as
individuals and as members of society.145

Because modification is a fact-oriented inquiry, “there is no
simple, mechanical, ‘cut and dried’ way” to determine whether
there has been a change in circumstances or whether that
change will be in the best interests of the child.146 Thus, the trial
court should consider the “broadest range of evidence” available
in order to make the best rational comparison between the
circumstances of each parent.147
C.

Third-Party Interests in Child Custody

There are third-party claims that can arise in any custody
proceeding, including those involving a child conceived through
rape. Third parties in child custody claims need to establish that
they qualify as a “person with a legitimate interest.”148 While
the court is required to give “due regard to the primacy of the
parent-child relationship,” persons with a legitimate interest
may prove through clear and convincing evidence that custody
or visitation with themselves is in the best interests of the
child.149 Third-party custody and visitation interests are
independent from that of the natural parents.150
In Williams v. Williams,151 the Supreme Court of Virginia
confirmed that third-party statutory custody claims152 implicate
the constitutional right of parental autonomy in child rearing,

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021) (explaining this classification is
broad, including grandparents, step-relations, blood relatives, and family
members as long as they have properly intervened in the suit or are otherwise
properly before the court).
149. Id. § 20-124.2(B).
150. See Dotson v. Hylton, 513 S.E.2d 635, 640 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)
(explaining that the paternal grandmother’s visitation rights were to be
considered independent of the visitation status of the incarcerated father).
151. 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998).
152. See id. at 418 (explaining that while the right of parents to raise their
child as they so choose is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section
20-124.2(B), which permits grandparents and other to seek visitation, presents
no constitutional problem).
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and thus must be justified by a compelling state interest.153 The
court then established the following standard: if both parents
object to a third party’s visitation, the court must find that
denial of visitation with the petitioning third-party would be
detrimental—resulting in actual harm—to the child’s health or
welfare.154
This test was clarified by the Virginia Court of Appeals in
Griffin v. Griffin.155 In Griffin, the mother objected to her former
husband, who was not the father of the child, having visitation
with the child.156 The natural father took no position with
respect to the former husband’s visitation.157 Relying heavily on
Troxel v. Granville,158 the Griffin court held that a singular
parent has the same constitutionally protected liberty interest
to object to contact between the child and a third party,
regardless of the parent’s marital status.159 The court further
explained that the opposition of one parent is sufficient as a
matter of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to deny
visitation with a non-parent, absent a showing of actual harm
to the child if such visitation is denied.160 Finally, the Griffin
court clarified that “actual harm” requires more than “the
obvious observation that the child would benefit from the

153. See id. (stating that to “constitute a compelling interest, state
interference with a parent’s right to raise his or her child must be for the
purpose of protecting the child’s health or welfare”).
154. See id. (explaining that the articulated standard is founded in the
“General Assembly’s intent” to give due primacy to the parent-child
relationship, and thus must be satisfied before “the court may interfere with
the constitutionally protected parental rights”).
155. 581 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
156. See id. at 900 (explaining that the wife appealed the trial court’s grant
of visitation to her former husband and argued that as a non-parent, he “could
not obtain visitation rights over her son on a mere showing of best interests”).
157. See id. at 901 (“[T]he other [natural] parent in our case . . . did not
request that visitation be awarded to husband.”).
158. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
159. See Griffin, 581 S.E.2d at 902 (“Nothing in Troxel implies that the
legal superiority of a fit parent’s rights over those of a non-parent turns on
whether the parent is married, separated, divorced, or widowed. A single
mother has no less constitutional right to parent her son than a married
mother.”) (citation omitted).
160. See id. at 903 (“Absent a showing of actual harm to the child, the
constitutional liberty interests of fit parents take precedence over the best
interests of the child.”) (citation omitted).
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continuing emotional attachment with the non-parent.”161 A
potential emotional loss was not enough to satisfy actual
harm.162
While single parents have equal constitutional footing in
third-party custody claims, Dotson v. Hylton163 established an
important exception to the Williams test.164 If the natural
parents are at odds concerning a third party’s claim of visitation,
the statutory mandate of whether such visitation would be in
the best interest of the child controls.165
Virginia law grants no custody or visitation right to a third
party whose interest in the child derives from a person whose
parental rights have been terminated.166 However, in the case of
a victim mother who is faced with a custody dispute with her
rapist, the current conviction requirement167 renders this
condition largely inconsequential.
D.

Potential Consequences of Virginia’s Family Law Scheme
on a Victim Mother and Child

A victim mother and the child she chose to keep are left
vulnerable to Virginia’s family law framework should her rapist
assert his rights to the child. Most rape victims recover from the

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 513 S.E.2d 901 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
164. Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Va. 1998) (“[B]efore
visitation can be ordered over the objection of the child’s parents, a court must
find an actual harm to the child’s health or welfare without such visitation.”)
(citing Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)).
165. Dotson v. Hylton, 513 S.E.2d 901, 903 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining
that when “only one parent objects to a grandparent’s visitation and the other
parent requests it, the trial court is not required” to follow the more stringent
Williams standard because the family is not “intact” (citation omitted)).
166. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021) (“A party with a legitimate
interest shall not include any person . . . whose interest in the child derives
from or through a person whose parental rights have been terminated, either
voluntarily or involuntarily . . . .” (emphasis added)).
167. See id.
A party with a legitimate interest shall not include any person . . . (iii) who
has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 . . . or an
equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign
jurisdiction, when the child who is the subject of the petition was conceived
as a result of such violation. (emphasis added)
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psychological after-effects of rape within a year of the attack.168
However, if a victim is forced to continue to interact with her
rapist through a court-mandated custody arrangement,
recovery is put at substantial risk.169
This is true for any custody arrangement: if a victim’s rapist
is awarded joint physical and legal custody, she is trapped in an
alternating physical custody arrangement and compelled to
coordinate with her attacker on all major decisions concerning
the child.170 If the court orders joint legal custody with the right
of visitation for the rapist father, she will have to coordinate
visitation time with her rapist and consult with him on major
decisions.171 Even if the victim mother is awarded sole custody172
over the child, that does not mean that the father is a legal
stranger to the child—the father still has a legal connection to
the child because his parental rights remain intact.173 That
connection to the child as a legal parent, though it does not
materialize in any meaningful legal or physical custody, is
harmful.
A victim may wish to move out of her home to somewhere
new, change her phone number, and undertake other actions to
try to move on from the attack.174 But a victim with a
court-mandated custody arrangement with her rapist cannot
168. Prewitt, supra note 75, at 833.
169. See id. at 833 (explaining that forcing a victim to repeatedly interact
with her attacker is “likely to impede her recovery process”).
170. See Wynnycky v. Kozel, 834 S.E.2d 512, 522 (Va. Ct. App. 2019)
(upholding a joint physical custody arrangement that would consist of “weekly
transitions between custodians” until the child entered the first grade).
171. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 834 S.E.2d 473, 476 (Va. Ct. App.
2019) (explaining that parties with a protective order in place can
communicate through “agreed-upon third parties” for the purpose “of making
decisions essential to joint legal custody,” and that visitation for the
noncustodial parent was proper).
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021) (defining sole custody as one
person retaining responsibility for the care and control of a child, and has
primary decision-making authority concerning the child).
173. See Rodgers v. Rodgers, No. 0404-07-3, 2008 WL 4386879, at *3 (Va.
Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2008) (“Father’s rights as a parent were not terminated
when the circuit court awarded sole custody to the mother.”).
174. See Patricia A. Frazier & Jeffery W. Burnett, Immediate Coping
Strategies Among Rape Victims, 72 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 633, 636 (1994)
(listing moving and taking other home safety precautions as common coping
behaviors).
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take those healing steps without seeking judicial permission to
change the custody order.175 Moreover, if the mother is forced
into a legal relationship with her rapist, her mental health may
deteriorate as a result of his continual presence in her life.176
This mental deterioration may affect her parenting and cause
the child to suffer, 177 which is contrary to the best interests
standard.178 Children are intuitive,179 and can internalize and
negatively react to the stress of their parents.180 If the victim
mother’s mental distress reaches a flashpoint, the rapist father
would then have the means to file for a modification of custody
based on the material change of circumstances standard.181
Ultimately, unless a victim mother can put forth proof that her
rapist was convicted of the offense, a court-mandated custody
arrangement is a possibility with potentially devastating effects
for both mother and child.

175. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 591 S.E.2d 698, 701 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (“A
court may forbid a custodial parent from removing children from the state
without the court’s permission . . . .”).
176. See Prewitt, supra note 75, at 833 (“[I]t seems likely that women
whose child-custody arrangements force continued interaction with their
rapists would also experience delays in healing.”).
177. See Lene Symes et al., Physical and Sexual Intimate Partner Violence,
Women’s Health and Children’s Behavioural Functioning: Entry Analysis of a
Seven-Year Prospective Study, 23 J. CLINICAL NURSING 2909, 2912 (2014)
(“Maternal mental health symptoms . . . positively correlated with child
depressive symptoms . . . .”).
178. See supra Part III.B.2.
179. See Jackie A. Nelson et al., Family Stress and Parental Responses to
Children’s Negative Emotions: Tests of the Spillover, Crossover, and
Compensatory Hypotheses, 23 J. FAM. PSYCH. 671, 672 (2009) (“Each individual
or subsystem in the family is influenced by the others.” (citation omitted)).
180. See Connie J. Beck et al., Children Conceived From Rape: Legislation,
Parental Rights and Outcomes for Victims, 15 J. CHILD CUSTODY 193, 200–01
(2018) (explaining that a child’s exposure to their mother’s stress and
“re-traumatization” can lead to behaviors such as “breaking the law, lying,
cheating and stealing . . . depression and other mental health problems”).
181. See, e.g., Bostick v. Bostick-Bennett, 478 S.E.2d 319, 323 (Va. Ct. App.
1996) (explaining that before determining whether or not to modify a custody
order, the court must find “a material change in circumstance” and “whether
a change in custody would be in the best interests of the child”).
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IV. LEGAL PROCEDURES WITH RAPE-RELATED PREGNANCY:
ABORTION
A woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.182 In the Commonwealth of Virginia, a
board-certified physician or nurse practitioner may legally
terminate or aid in terminating a pregnancy by performing an
abortion or causing a miscarriage on “any woman during the
first trimester of pregnancy.”183 During the second trimester of
pregnancy, a board-certified physician may legally terminate or
aid in terminating a pregnancy by performing an abortion or
causing a miscarriage on any woman, provided that the
procedure is performed in a licensed hospital.184 Following the
second trimester, it is lawful for any board-certified physician to
terminate a pregnancy by performing an abortion or causing a
miscarriage on any woman so long as particular conditions are
met.185

182. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(explaining that abortion is among precedents that involve the private realm
of family life and “[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-72 (2021).
184. See id. § 18.2-73 (stating that the procedure must be performed in a
hospital licensed by “the State Department of Health or operated by the
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services”). This
provision of the Code was ruled unconstitutional as applied in Falls Church
Medical Center, LLC v. Oliver, 412 F. Supp. 3d 668 (E.D. Va. 2019). The court
held that requiring the performance of second-trimester abortions to be in
licensed hospitals was and “unduly burdensome in violation of the Due Process
Clause.” Id. at 687–88. The General Assembly has yet to amend the Code
provision following the Falls Church decision.
185. See id. § 18.2-74
Said operation is performed in a hospital licensed by the Virginia State
Department of Health or operated by the Department of Behavioral Health
and Developmental Services. The physician and two consulting physicians
certify and so enter in the hospital record of the woman, that in their medical
opinion, based upon their best clinical judgment, the continuation of the
pregnancy is likely to result in the death of the woman or substantially and
irremediably impair the mental or physical health of the woman. Measures
for life support for the product of such abortion or miscarriage must be
available and utilized if there is any clearly visible evidence of viability.
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A woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy must give
informed written consent before the procedure is undertaken.186
With the exception of minors in certain cases,187 there is no
third-party notice provided concerning a woman’s decision to
terminate a pregnancy. Finally, Virginia permits state funding
for abortions of pregnancies that are the result of rape or incest,
provided that the victim reports the attack to law enforcement
or a public health facility.188
Accordingly, a biological father—rapist or not—is not
awarded any right to notice or consent if a woman chooses to get
an abortion at any stage of the pregnancy. For pregnant rape
victims who choose abortion, this is critical: there is no legal
requirement that a victim’s rapist know that she has decided to
terminate the pregnancy.
V.

LEGAL PROCEDURES WITH RAPE-RELATED PREGNANCY:
ADOPTION

In Virginia, a child may be placed for adoption through
parental placement189 or by way of a child-placing agency.190 As
with custody determinations, the best interests of the child

186. See id. § 18.2-76 (stating that if the woman seeking the abortion is
deemed by a court of competent jurisdiction to be incapacitated, permission in
writing must be given by a “parent, guardian, committee, or other person
standing in loco parentis to the woman”).
187. See id. § 16.1-241(W) (stating that an authorized physician shall
expressly provide notice of the anticipated abortion to an “authorized person,”
meaning a parent, duly appointed guardian or custodian, or a person standing
in loco parentis, unless the notice is not in the “best interest of the minor”).
188. See id. § 32.1-92.1 (explaining that public funds are available “for
women who otherwise meet the financial eligibility criteria of the State
Medical Assistance Plan in any case in which a pregnancy occurs as a result
of rape or incest and which is reported to a law-enforcement or public health
agency”).
189. See id. § 63.2-100 (defining parental placement as “locating or
effecting the placement of a child or the placing of a child in a family home by
the child’s parent or legal guardian for the purpose of foster care or adoption”).
For more information on parental placement adoptions, see id. §§ 16.2-1230
to -1240.
190. See id. § 63.2-1221 (defining adoption by child-placing agency or local
board). For more information on agency adoptions, see id. §§ 63.2-1222
to -1229.
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standard is controlling in adoption cases.191 In Virginia, “[a]ny
man who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a woman is
deemed to be on legal notice that a child may be conceived and
that the man is entitled to all legal rights and obligations
resulting therefrom.”192 The legal rights of notice and consent
accompany all adoptions, barring explicit and limited
exceptions.
While lack of knowledge of a pregnancy does not excuse
failure to timely register with the Virginia Birth Father
Registry,193 if the identity and whereabouts of the birth father
are “reasonably ascertainable,” the child-placing agency or
adoptive parents must give written notice concerning the
adoption plan and the option to register with the Birth Father
Registry.194 With an agency adoption, if a birth father is
required to be given notice pursuant to Section 63.2-1250,195 he
may be given notice of the entrustment agreement196 by
registered or certified mail to his last known address.197 If a
birth father is required to be given notice in a parental

191. See id. § 63.2-1205 (explaining that the court may consider the birth
parents’ relative ability as parents, their efforts to maintain custody over the
child, and other relevant factors in determining the best interests of the child
in the adoption context).
192. Id. § 63.2-1250(A).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 63.2-1250(F)
Such written notice shall be provided by personal service or by certified
mailing to the birth father’s last known address. Registration is timely if the
signed registration form is received by the Department within ten days of
personal service of the written notice or within thirteen days of the certified
mailing date of the written notice.

195. See id. §§ 63.2-1250(F)–(G) (describing the notification procedures for
the adoption plan and the availability of registration with the Virginia Birth
Father Registry, and the requirement of notice of placement with a local board
and proceedings concerning adoptions and termination of parental rights for
registrants that have timely registered).
196. See id. § 63.2-1221 (explaining that entrustment agreements divest
birth parents “of all legal rights and obligations with respect to the child, and
the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to them”).
197. See id. §§ 63.2-1222(A)–(B) (explaining the requirements of validity
for entrustment agreements and the procedures concerning notice).
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placement adoption, that notice may be given by registered or
certified mail to his last known address.198
Generally, consent of both birth parents is necessary for an
adoption in Virginia.199 Written consent must be filed in
conjunction with the adoption petition.200 A court may not accept
consent until it determines that the birth parents are aware of
alternatives to adoption, a child-placing agency has counseled
the adoptive parents about adoption procedures, and the
adoptive parents are made aware of the rights of the birth
parents and the termination of those rights.201 The consent of
both the birth parents and the adoptive parents must be
informed and uncoerced,202 and all parties must exchange
pertinent identifying information unless the parties agree to
waive that exchange.203
There are limited and explicit exceptions to the parental
notification and consent requirements. Consent is not required
if the birth parent has neither visited nor contacted the child for
six months immediately following the filing of the petition for
adoption or the filing of a petition to consent to an adoption.204
The prospective adoptive parents must establish the lack of
contact by clear and convincing evidence.205 Further, a birth
parent is not entitled to notice or required to give consent if their
parental rights have been previously terminated206 or if a birth

198. Id. § 63.2-1233(1)(c).
199. See id. § 63.2-1202 (stating that consent must be executed by the birth
mother and by any man who is (a) an acknowledged father, (b) an adjudicated
father, (c) a presumed father by way of marriage to the mother, or (d) has
registered with the Virginia Father Birth Registry).
200. Id. § 63.2-1202(A).
201. Id. §§ 63.2-1232(A)(1)–(2).
202. Id.
203. See id. § 63.2-1232(A)(3) (explaining that such information includes
but is not limited to “full names, addresses, physical, mental, social and
psychological information and any other information necessary to promote the
welfare of the child, unless both parties agree in writing to waive the disclosure
of full names and addresses”).
204. See id. § 63.2-1202(H) (stating that the lack of visitation and contact
must be “without just cause”).
205. Id.
206. See id. § 63.2-1202(G) (“No notice or consent shall be required of any
person whose parental rights have been terminated by a court of competent
jurisdiction . . . .”).

162

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 129 (2021)

father has been convicted of violating the rape statute207 and the
child was conceived as a result of that violation.208
Given the statutory framework, a victim mother that is
seeking to place her child for adoption must put forth proof of
conviction of rape in order to bypass the consent and notice
requirements. Without such proof, a victim mother must
contend with the possibility that her rapist will object to the
adoption and that she will be forced to participate in litigation
alongside her attacker concerning the future of a child that she
does not wish to keep for herself.
VI. VIRGINIA’S CURRENT CONVICTION REQUIREMENTS AND THE
AVAILABLE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD THAT SHOULD REPLACE IT
A.

The Fundamental Unfairness of Virginia’s Current
Conviction Requirement

As presented in the foregoing Parts, Virginia’s statutory
scheme covering parental rights over a child born of rape
features conviction requirements in both the basic custody
context and in adoption proceedings.209 As a result, the
Commonwealth leaves a pregnant rape victim with an
unnecessarily difficult decision: either exercise her right to an
abortion and be free of her attacker forever, or face the risk of
having her rapist assert his parental rights over the child,
regardless of whether she chooses to keep and raise the child or
put it up for adoption.
State legislatures sometimes enact statutes that lack
explicit compelling language, but in practice compel private
citizens to make choices they otherwise would not have made.210
207. See id. § 18.2-61(A) (defining rape); see also supra Part II.A.
208. See id. § 63.2-1202(F) (stating that with agency adoptions, no consent
is required from a birth father that has been convicted of a violation of the rape
where the child was conceived as a result of the violation and the father is not
entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings); see also § 63.2-1233(6) (stating
that with parental placement adoptions, an identical conviction requirement
is in place concerning notice and consent).
209. See supra Parts III, V.
210. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion:
Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83
WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) (noting that the mandatory information given under
informed consent statutes may mislead a woman when “it inappropriately
takes advantage of emotional influence to bias an individual’s decision away
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Just as some informed consent statutes implicitly coerce women
to decide against aborting a pregnancy,211 there is an argument
that Virginia’s current conviction requirements implicitly
intimidate women who become pregnant through rape to get an
abortion.
Whether or not to require a rape conviction when
terminating a rapist’s parental rights is an issue that has split
states.212 While this Note focuses on Virginia, it has wider

from the decision that would be made in a non-emotional, fully informed
state”); Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion:
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
111, 152 (2008) (explaining that the information contained in mandatory
printed materials, though not explicit in the informed consent statute
mandating the presentation of such materials, “may influence women to take
on additional costs and medical risks”); Joanne E. Brosh & Monica K. Miller,
Regulating Pregnancy Behaviors: How the Constitutional Rights of Minority
Women are Disproportionately Compromised, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 437, 453 (2008) (explaining that “statutes and laws governing pregnancy
behavior unfairly—even if unintentionally—negatively influence the
pregnancy decisions and outcomes of minority women”).
211. See Blumenthal, supra note 210, at 31
[U]nder Casey’s “truthful and misleading” standard, a communication
designed to influence a woman’s decision whether to abort may be
considered an undue burden when it is inappropriately manipulative
(deliberately or not) by inducing fear or anxiety, or when it inappropriately
affects her ability to decide, leading to a decision that she would not have
made under the influence of such an emotion.

212. In addition to Virginia, the following states and the District of
Columbia require proof of conviction before terminating parental rights:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(b) (2021);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-416 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-121 (2021); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3030(b) (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 724A(e) (2021);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(k) (West 2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.322 (West
2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 3(a) (West 2021); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-609(1)(c) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292(11) (West 2021); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.105(1)(b)(8) (West 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1(a)
(West 2021); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-c)(b)(A) (McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111 (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20.3-20(1)(e)
(West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.501(B)(1) (West 2021); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 419B.510(1) (West 2021); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2511(7), 4321(2.1) (West 2021); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-7(a)(2)(viii)
(West 2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570(11) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-113(g)(10)(A) (2021); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-209a(a) (West 2021);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(ix) (2021).
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implications due to the problematic nature of a conviction
requirement in a parental rights termination proceeding for a
rapist father. In order to secure a conviction against her rapist,
the victim, through her local prosecutor, must present evidence
that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
committed rape.213 This is a burdensome requirement to import
into a civil family law proceeding, and greatly disadvantages the
victim mother who is seeking to sever her and her child’s legal
connection to the rapist father.214 Because rape is so rarely
convicted,215 conditioning the termination of parental rights on
a conviction decides the matter before it even begins.216
A victim who bears a child resulting from rape faces a
nearly insurmountable legal burden when seeking to insulate
herself and her child from continued contact with her rapist. In
the custody and visitation context, the father’s ability to
repeatedly seek,217 and perhaps even be awarded, custody or
visitation means that the victim mother will be attached to her
rapist until her child turns eighteen. This will likely impede a
full recovery from the psychological after-effects of her rape.218
The current conviction requirement leaves the victims that
choose to keep their children conceived through rape in
purgatory, forcing them to interact with their attacker219 within

213. See Crawford v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 107, 120 (Va. 2011)
(explaining that to obtain a rape conviction, the Commonwealth must prove
“beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant had sexual intercourse with
the victim; (2) that it was against her will and without her consent; and (3)
that it was by force, threat or intimidation”).
214. See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST
NAT’L NETWORK, https://perma.cc/M56D-N8CQ (stating that out of every 1,000
sexual assaults, only twenty-eight cases will lead to a felony conviction).
215. See id.
216. See Brown et al., supra note 49, at 432 (“[A] requirement for criminal
conviction prevents many survivors from realistically accessing these laws
designed for their benefit.”).
217. See supra Part III.B.3.
218. See Prewitt, supra note 75, at 833 (stating that the psychological
effects of rape include “fears, phobias, anxieties, somatic symptoms,
obsessions, depressive symptoms, and even suicidal ideation”).
219. See Patterson, supra note 12 (interviewing Noemi Martinez who is
now “forced to parent” with her rapist and is left with the emotionally
exhausting task of setting up regular visitation between the child and the
rapist).
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the court-mandated custody relationship, unable to move
forward and heal.220
The conviction requirement in the adoption context leaves
the victim mother putting the child up for adoption in a similar
position as the victim mother who chooses to keep her child,
rendering adoption an inadequate alternative to abortion.
Unless a victim mother can put forth proof of a rape
conviction,221 the consent and notification requirements for
adoptions will leave her vulnerable to ongoing contact with her
rapist through litigation.222 This is punitive. Instead of being
able to relinquish the child in a safe and straightforward
manner without involving her rapist, Virginia imposes an
impossible standard on a mother that has already endured the
horror of rape223 and has made the often painful decision to put
the child up for adoption.224 Maintaining a conviction
requirement in an adoption context theoretically forces the
victim mother to participate in—or at the very least be aware
of—legal proceedings in which her rapist may not only fight
efforts to terminate his parental rights, but also seek to have the
child placed in his care instead of the care of the petitioning
adoptive parents. The prospect of a victim mother being
compelled to engage in litigation concerning a child she does not
220. See Prewitt, supra note 75, at 833 (“[F]orcing a woman to repeatedly
face her rapist, or reminders of him, is likely to impede her recovery process.”).
221. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1202(F) (2021) (stating that in granting a
petition for adoption, no consent will be required of the birth father when he
has been convicted of a violation of rape, carnal knowledge, or incest statute
and the child was conceived as a result of the violation); § 63.2-1233(6) (same).
222. See id. § 63.2-1202(A) (“No petition for adoption shall be
granted . . . unless written consent to the proposed adoption is filed with the
petition. Such consent shall be in writing, signed under oath and
acknowledged before an officer authorized by law to acknowledgment.”);
§ 63.2-1233(1)(c) (stating that when a birth father is required to be given notice
“he may be given notice of the adoption by registered or certified mail to his
last known address”).
223. See 141 CONG. REC. 21,925 (1995) (“Rape is someone grabbing you,
assaulting you, overwhelming you with fear for your life and then violating
you in the most deeply personal and destructive way.” (statement of Rep.
Johnson)).
224. See Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors’ Consent in
Abortion and Adoption, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 138 (2013) (“During the
prerelinquishment period, a mother experiences emotional issues in adjusting
to pregnancy, as well as difficulties in making complex decisions about
relinquishment.”).
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wish to keep for herself, but certainly would not want in the care
of a man capable of sexual violence, is alarming.
B.

The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard

Twenty states allow for the complete termination of a
rapist’s parental rights without requiring proof of conviction.225
This legislative decision has been rationalized by acknowledging
an interest in protecting victims of sexual assault,226 presuming
that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
child when the child is conceived through unlawful sexual
battery,227 and recognizing that a legally enforceable, ongoing
relationship with an abuser is damaging.228 In these
jurisdictions, if the victim mother can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that her alleged attacker raped her and the
child at issue was conceived as a result, the court may terminate
the rapist’s parental rights.229
Virginia courts interpret clear and convincing evidence as
“[t]hat measure or degree of proof which will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

225. These states are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, and Washington. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (West
2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7 (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112
(West 2021); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(m) (West 2021); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-8-10(a)(4), 19-8-11(a)(3)(A)(iv) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 571-61(b)(5) (West 2021); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005(2)(a) (West 2021); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-35-3.5-7 (West 2021); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(1)(p) (West
2021); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1004 (2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4055(1-B) (2021); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1402(a) (West 2021); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1445(2) (West 2021); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-15-119(1)(b) (2021); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(11) (West 2021); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-5-19(C) (2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(11) (West
2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20 (2021); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.007(a) (West 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(f) (2021); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26A.465 (West 2021).
226. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7(1) (2021).
227. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(m) (West 2021).
228. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(f) (2021).
229. See Natalie Hoch, Note, The Real American Horror Story: Overcoming
the Hurdles to Terminate a Rapist’s Parental Rights, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 783,
805 (2017).
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allegations sought to be established.”230 Clear and convincing
evidence is an intermediate standard, finding a middle ground
between more than a “mere preponderance” and the stringent
certainty requirements of beyond a reasonable doubt.231 This
standard is more appropriate in termination of parental rights
proceedings, which are civil.
1.

Constitutional Considerations with the Termination of
Parental Rights
a.

Due Process

Legislation that permits termination of a rapist father’s
parental rights upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the child was conceived as a result of his rape is essential
to ensure that rape victims and their children conceived through
rape are adequately protected in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
It would also withstand any constitutional challenge.
The state must be cognizant of due process concerns when
considering legislation that seeks to limit a rapist father’s right
to custody of or visitation with the child conceived by his rape.232
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the
interest of a parent in the “care, control and custody of their
children” is among the oldest fundamental liberty interests
protected by Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.233
This Fourteenth Amendment protection “guarantees that a
State will treat individuals with ‘fundamental fairness’
whenever its actions infringe their protected liberty or property
interests.”234 However, the rapist father’s due process rights can
be satisfied by the explicit adoption of the clear and convincing
evidence standard in cases involving the termination of parental
rights for such fathers.

230. Edmonds v. Edmonds, 772 S.E.2d 898, 905 (Va. 2015).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 63, at 221 (“[L]egislatures must be
careful in designing statutes to avoid such [due process] challenges . . . .”).
233. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
234. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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In Santosky v. Kramer,235 the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmatively held that the clear and convincing evidence
standard satisfies due process in termination of parental rights
proceedings.236 The Court acknowledged that the issues
presented in termination proceedings often struggle to rise to a
level of absolute certainty.237 In the Court’s view, the clear and
convincing evidence standard was found to sufficiently
communicate “to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty
about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due
process.”238
Undoubtedly, rape is a nuanced and complex crime.239
Employing the clear and convincing evidence standard will
protect both the due process rights of the father and the
interests of the victim mother in restricting his access to her and
the child. A “firm belief or conviction”240 in the mind of the trier
of fact that the rape occurred adequately alleviates concerns
that the father will be unduly stripped of his parental rights.241
Moreover, requiring a victim mother to put forth evidence of
rape that engenders “a firm belief or conviction”242 as to the
allegation is a more attainable standard that beyond all
reasonable doubt.243

235. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The issue in Santosky involved the termination
of parental rights in New York surrounding child abuse and neglect on the
part of the natural parents and the due process implications of termination.
Id. at 745–46.
236. See id. at 769 (acknowledging that the states have found that the
standard “strikes a fair balance between the rights of the natural parents and
the State’s legitimate concerns”).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See supra Parts II.A–B.
240. Edmonds v. Edmonds, 772 S.E.2d 898, 905 (Va. 2015).
241. See Kessler, supra note 63, at 223 (“The rapist father’s rights will be
protected because the victim mother will be required to prove that the rape
occurred before he can be stripped of his rights.”).
242. Edmonds, 772 S.E.2d at 905.
243. See Kessler, supra note 63, at 223 (explaining that the clear and
convincing evidence standard allows victim mothers who do not see their
attackers convicted under the criminal standard to find respite in civil court).
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Judicial Scrutiny

A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or
her children is constitutionally protected.244 While such rights
are fundamental,245 the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
articulate the level of scrutiny that courts should apply when
considering infringements on parental rights.246 This lack of
clarity has led to uncertainty amongst lower court decisions
affecting parental rights.247 Although there is at present no
reliable level of scrutiny that a reviewing court should apply,
legislation that terminates the parental rights of rapists by
relying on the clear and convincing evidence standard would
survive even strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny review,
the state “must prove that the challenged law is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest”248 and
that the law achieves this interest by the least restrictive means
possible.249 A termination statute that plainly states that the
provision only applies to those fathers who have been found by
clear and convincing evidence to have raped the mother,
resulting in the conception of the child, is sufficiently narrowly
tailored to withstand strict scrutiny because it explicitly states
what rights are affected and the class of fathers it will impact.250
244. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
245. Id.
246. See id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that while the
plurality recognized that the right to rear children is a fundamental
constitutional right, “curiously none of them articulates the appropriate
standard of review”); Nicole Thieneman Maddox, Silencing Students’ Cell
Phones Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: Do Public Schools’ Cell Phone
Confiscation and Retention Policies Violate Parents’ Due Process Rights?, 41
J.L. & EDUC. 261, 267 (2012) (“Even after the Supreme Court’s announcement
of parents’ rights to manage their children as fundamental, the question of the
appropriate standard of review for a state’s justified intrusion remains
unclear.”).
247. See Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula:
Revisiting Mozert After 20 Years, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 83, 101–02 (2009)
(explaining the split between circuit and district courts on whether to invoke
strict scrutiny review, rational basis, or some intermediary level of scrutiny).
248. Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 133 (4th Cir. 2017).
249. See Mahan v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 315 S.E.2d 829,
834 (Va. 1984) (stating that a statute implicating a fundamental constitutional
right will survive strict scrutiny only if the compelling interest is achieved by
“the least burdensome means available”).
250. Kessler, supra note 63, at 226.
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The state has an obvious and compelling interest in
ensuring and protecting the best interests of the child251 and
ensuring the welfare of the victim mother.252 From the
standpoint of the child, there is a substantial likelihood of harm
because of stigma, fear, anxiety, and isolation.253 The same, and
perhaps worse, holds true for the mother. Although many rape
victims typically recover from the psychological effects of their
rapes within a year if they are able to place distance between
themself and the attack,254 a victim mother that is forced to
interact with her rapist in an ongoing custody relationship will
likely experience ongoing psychological harms, including delays
in recovery.255 If the victim mother is continually suffering from
PTSD,256 depression,257 or other negative mental health
conditions258 as a result of the ongoing legal connection to her
rapist, she may not be able to effectively parent her child.259
Exposing the child to such stress can lead to an increased risk

251. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (“[T]he
State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child . . . .”).
252. See Kessler, supra note 63, at 226.
253. See Andrew Solomon, The Legitimate Children of Rape, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 29, 2012), https://perma.cc/U6C2-X9B3 (exploring the “challenging
identity” of rape-conceived children and the impact on the mothers that choose
to keep them); see also Beck et al., supra note 180, at 200 (explaining the
potential negative physical and mental effects on a child that witnesses and
endures continued contact with the mother’s rapist).
254. Prewitt, supra note 75, at 833.
255. See id. (stating that similar to the delay in healing that women who
prosecute rape experience, “it seems likely that women whose child-custody
arrangements also would experience delays in healing”).
256. See Kilpatrick, supra note 76 (noting that “31 percent of all rape
victims developed PTSD in their lifetime”).
257. See Heidi M. Zinzow et al., Prevalence and Risk of Psychiatric
Disorder as a Function of Variant Rape Histories, 47 SOC. PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 893, 900 (2011) (finding that rape survivors are
5.46 times more likely to experience a major depressive episode compared to
non-sexual assault victims).
258. See Prewitt, supra note 75, at 833 (stating that the psychological
effects of rape include “fears, phobias, anxieties, somatic symptoms,
obsessions, depressive symptoms, and even suicidal ideation”).
259. See Beck et al., supra note 180, at 200 (stating that a delayed recovery
process in light of continued contact with a victim’s attacker can impact a
victim’s parenting and cause a strained relationship between mother and
child).
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that the child will endure physical and mental harm,260 which
would conflict with the child’s best interests.261
Finally, there are no less restrictive means that the state
could consider that would sufficiently address the articulated
harms.262 The termination of the rapist father’s parental rights
is the only option available that protects the victim mother and
child from having to litigate, and relitigate,263 the child’s custody
and visitation. Termination will ensure that the rapist will
never have legally sanctioned contact with the child and
guarantee that a mother bearing a child conceived through rape
who wishes to place the child for adoption can do so freely.
Statutes that terminate the parental rights of rapists can
effectively address due process and judicial scrutiny concerns
through careful drafting. Thus, Virginia can set aside any
constitutional concerns and enact legislation that effectively
addresses both sides of a potential dispute.
2.

The Rape Survivor Child Custody Act

The federal government has already addressed this issue.
In enacting the Rape Survivor Child Custody Act (RSCCA),264
Congress recognized that men who father children through rape
should be barred from having access to those children,265 and, in
so doing, acknowledged that the possibility of a custody battle
with a rapist266 could traumatize both the victim267 and the

260. See id. (“If the child is exposed to their mother’s stress and gains
knowledge and gains knowledge of their role in the trauma, the physical and
mental well-being of the child can also be negatively affected.”).
261. Supra Part III.B.2.
262. See Ted L. Willis, Religious Landmarks, Guidelines for Analysis: Free
Exercise, Takings, and Least Restrictive Means, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 211, 227
(1992) (stating that least restrictive means “forces the government to consider
alternate, less burdensome methods to pursue its purposes in regulation”).
263. See supra Part III.B.3.
264. 34 U.S.C. §§ 21301–21308.
265. Id. § 21302(1).
266. Id. § 21302(3).
267. See id. § 21302(8) (“A rapist pursuing parental or custody rights
causes the survivor to have continued interaction with the rapist, which can
have traumatic psychological effects on the survivor, and can make it more
difficult for her to recover.”).

172

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 129 (2021)

child.268 In order to incentivize states to enact statutes that
advance the goals that animate the RSCCA, the Act provides
enhanced federal grant funding269 for states that have
legislation that allows the mothers of children conceived
through rape to seek termination of their rapist’s parental
rights.270 If Virginia adopts the clear and convincing evidence
standard, it will be eligible for funding under the RSCCA.
In order to receive funding under the RSCCA, a state must
demonstrate that its law imposes the clear and convincing
evidence standard in cases that seek to terminate parental
rights by establishing the requisite rape.271 States with
termination laws that rely on the clear and convincing evidence
standard are eligible for award increases of up to ten percent of
the average amount of funding received under the three most
recent awards.272 This increased funding will be awarded for a
two-year period and can be granted up to four times.273
As with any other state that has satisfactory legislation,
Virginia has the potential to receive considerable additional
funds from Congress aimed at protecting the safety and
wellbeing of women and children. For example, as of the 2020
fiscal year, the Commonwealth of Virginia could receive
approximately $368,000 in additional funding under the STOP
Violence Against Women Formula Grant Program274 and

268. See id. § 21302(9) (“These traumatic effects on the mother can
severely negatively impact her ability to raise a healthy child.”).
269. See id. § 10441 (detailing the funding provisions of the STOP Violence
Against Women Program Formula Grant Program); § 12511 (detailing the
funding provisions of the Sexual Assault Services Program).
270. See id. § 21303
The Attorney General shall increase the amount provided to a State under
the covered formula grants in accordance with this chapter if the State has
in place a law that allows the mother of any child that was conceived
through rape to seek court-ordered termination of the parental rights of her
rapist with regard to that child, which the court is authorized to grant upon
clear and convincing evidence of rape. (emphasis added)

271. Id. § 21304.
272. Id. § 21305.
273. Id. § 21306.
274. See Awards by State and Program, DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, https://perma.cc/27VJ-CPNS (last updated Dec. 7, 2020).
This approximation is based on an average of the following data provided by
the Justice Department: Virginia received $3,686,105 in 2018, $3,691,882 in
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$49,000 under Sexual Assault Services Formula Grant
Program275 if it adopted legislation regarding termination of the
parental rights of rapists that included the clear and convincing
evidence standard.276 Thus, the adoption of the clear and
convincing evidence standard would be a legislative win-win: it
would fiscally benefit the state and protect rape victims who
choose to give birth to the children born of their victimization.
C.

The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard in
Termination Proceedings

Out of the states that rely on the clear and convincing
evidence standard, Colorado and Michigan provide cogent
models for Virginia to refer to when amending its existing
law.277
1.

Colorado

Colorado has adopted a provision that is specifically
concerned with the termination of the legal parent-child
relationship in cases in which there is an allegation that a child
was conceived as a result of sexual assault, but no conviction has
occurred.278 The statute begins by declaring that the Colorado
General Assembly enacted the provision to protect those victims
of sexual assault that were unable to procure a conviction and
2019, and $3,661,636 in 2020 in funding under the STOP Formula Grant
Program. Id.
275. See id. This approximation is based on an average of the following
information found in the data provided by the Justice Department: Virginia
received $465,233 in 2018, $498,691 in 2019, and $505,182 in 2020 in funding
under the Sexual Assault Services Formula Grant Program. Id.
276. 34 U.S.C. § 21303.
277. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021)
“Person with legitimate interest” shall be broadly construed and includes,
but is not limited to, grandparents, step-grandparents, stepparents, former
stepparents, blood relatives and family members provided any such party
has intervened in the suit or is otherwise properly before the court. A party
with a legitimate interest shall not include any person (i) whose parental
rights have been terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily . . . or (iii)
who has been convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 . . . or an
equivalent offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign
jurisdiction, when the child who is the subject of the petition was conceived
as a result of such violation. (emphasis added)

278.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7 (2021).
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to protect the child conceived as a result of that sexual
assault.279 The statute plainly states that the provision was
created to protect the interests of the victim petitioning the
court and the child in question, not to punish the perpetrator.280
Procedurally, under the Colorado scheme, a victim mother
may file a petition in juvenile court to prevent future contact by
the parent who allegedly committed the sexual assault that
resulted in the conception of the child at issue and to terminate
the parental rights of the parent who allegedly committed the
assault.281 The petition must allege the following: that the
respondent father committed an act of sexual assault against
the petitioner, that the respondent father has not been convicted
of the sexual assault, that a child was conceived as a result of
the sexual assault, and that termination of the parent-child
legal relationship of the respondent father with the child is in
the best interests of the child.282 The respondent father is then
personally served283 and a guardian ad litem is appointed to
represent the child’s best interests.284 Both parties have the
right to be represented by counsel during proceedings285 and the
petitioner’s and the child’s whereabouts must be kept
confidential.286
Under the Colorado framework, the court shall terminate
the parent-child relationship of the respondent if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence each element of the petition.
Termination of the legal parent-child relationship relieves the
respondent father of all parental rights including parenting
time, the right to make decisions concerning the child, the right
of inheritance, and the right to notification of or objection to the
adoption of the child.287 Termination does not relieve the

279. Id. § 19-5-105.7(1).
280. Id.
281. Id. § 19-5-105.7(3).
282. Id. §§ 19-5-105.7(4)(a)–(d).
283. See id. § 19-5-105.7(5)(a). This section of the statute also states that
during the service stage, the petitioner may request that she and the child be
identified by initials in the summons in order to further privacy interests. Id.
284. Id. § 19-5-105.7(6).
285. Id.
286. Id. § 19-5-105.7(7).
287. Id. §§ 19-5-105.7(13)(a)(I)–(III).
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respondent father of any child support obligations, though the
petitioner can waive this obligation if she so chooses.288
2.

Michigan

Michigan’s scheme289 provides that a victim mother may
bring an action for termination of parental rights following a
fact-finding hearing that proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the child was conceived through nonconsensual
sexual penetration.290 Following the establishment of these facts
by the required standard of proof, the Michigan scheme requires
the court to undertake one of the following actions: revoke an
acknowledgment of parentage for a previously acknowledged
father, determine that a genetic father is not the child’s father,
set aside an order of filiation,291 or make a determination of
paternity regarding an alleged father and enter an order of
revocation of paternity for that father.292
D.

Proposed Termination of Parental Rights Statute for
Virginia

Virginia’s adoption of a clear and convincing evidence
standard in a distinct termination statute would greatly
alleviate the potential horror of a legally enforceable
relationship with one’s rapist. This Note provides a suggested
statute that the Virginia General Assembly should consider and
adopt.293
The proposed statute begins by stating the Virginia General
Assembly’s reasoning behind the adoption of the statute. This
mirrors the Colorado statute’s introduction294 and provides a
foundational explanation for the rationale behind the
legislation. The proposed statute features a definition section
and identifies where the victim must file her petition and the

288. Id. § 19-5-105.7(13)(b).
289. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1445 (West 2021).
290. Id. § 722.1445(2).
291. See id. § 722.1433 (defining an order of filiation as “a judicial order
establishing an affiliated father”).
292. Id. §§ 722.1445(2)(a)–(d).
293. See infra Appendix I.
294. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7(1) (2021).
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necessary elements that must be alleged. Further, the proposed
statute outlines the procedures for proper notice and summons,
the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and the process for
genetic testing if requested. The proposed statute also states
that both the petitioner and the respondent to have right to
counsel and provides privacy protections for the petitioner if
requested.
The proposed statute employs “shall” when dictating the
court’s action concerning termination when it has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the father committed rape
and the child was conceived as a result. This mirrors the
language in both the Colorado and Michigan schemes.295 As long
as the evidence presented meets the standard, the judge must
terminate the parental rights of the father as stated in the
statute. The choice of language is critical: judicial discretion in
such a proceeding can at times work against the victim
mother,296 and the removal of such discretion by employing the
word “shall” promotes uniformity and strips the judge of any
opportunity to rule in favor of the father when the evidence has
established him as a rapist.297
Finally, the proposed statute articulates the parental rights
that the respondent father will be deprived of if the child is
proven to be a product of his rape by clear and convincing
evidence. The proposed statute concludes with a note on the
continuing obligation of child support, unless such support is
waived by the petitioner.
295. See id. § 19-5-105.7(11)(a) (“The court shall terminate the
parent-child legal relationship of the respondent if the court finds [the
elements of the petition] by clear and convincing evidence. . . . ”) (emphasis
added); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1445(2) (West 2021) (explaining that
“[i]f an action is brought by a mother who, after a fact-finding hearing, proves
by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of
nonconsensual sexual penetration, the court shall” take one of the listed
actions (emphasis added)).
296. See Prewitt, supra note 75, at 858 (stating that in states that reserve
judicial discretion in termination proceedings that employ the clear and
convincing evidence standard, “a raped woman must be willing to gamble that
the trial judge will exercise discretion in her favor” and not in favor of her
rapist).
297. See id. (“[A] raped woman may face the real possibility of a trial judge
determining that a father’s sexual misconduct has no bearing on his ability to
effectively parent and using the best interest standard to counsel in favor of
denying termination.”).
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Because this is a question of terminating parental rights,
there will have to be a fact-finding hearing over whether or not
the rape occurred. This hearing is not meant to punish the
father or hold him criminally liable. This hearing exists for the
purpose of establishing the fact that the rape happened, and
that the child was conceived as a result.
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that the clear and
convincing evidence standard is constitutional in termination
proceedings.298 Even though the legal system cannot be avoided,
if the clear and convincing evidence standard is employed, then
the victim mother need only deal with the legal system once,
avoiding unnecessary relitigation and re-traumatization.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rape-related
pregnancy
is
a
horrific
potential
299
300
consequence of a uniquely devastating crime. A rape victim
has endured an intentional, malicious, and violative attack,301
and if she conceives a child as a result, she is faced with a
difficult decision regarding the outcome of that conception. The
decision to abort, place for adoption, or keep and raise a child
conceived through rape should be left with the victim. The
Commonwealth of Virginia frustrates that decision by requiring
proof of conviction in the adoption302 and basic custody
contexts,303 especially given the fact that rape is not often
convicted.304 These conviction requirements further violate her

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
Id.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021)

“Person with legitimate interest” shall be broadly construed and includes,
but is not limited to, grandparents, step-grandparents, stepparents, former
stepparents, blood relatives and family members provided any such party
has intervened in the suit or is otherwise properly before the court. A party
with a legitimate interest shall not include any person . . . (iii) who has been
convicted of a violation of subsection A of § 18.2-61 . . . or an equivalent
offense of another state, the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, when
the child who is the subject of the petition was conceived as a result of such
violation. (emphasis added)

304.

See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
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safety and security by depriving her of choice in a life-altering
decision.
However, the adoption of the clear and convincing evidence
standard in termination of parental rights proceedings
enhances her capacity to make that difficult decision. This
standard addresses the due process rights305 of the father and
survives judicial scrutiny,306 while providing adequate
protection for the victim mother and child.307
Termination of parental rights is a civil matter,308 and thus
should be subject to a civil standard of proof. To employ the
criminal standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt309 in a
civil matter intended to protect those victims that become
pregnant through rape renders that protection completely
illegitimate. This is a complicated issue that has divided
states,310 but the Commonwealth of Virginia should strive to
protect, not punish, victim mothers and the children born of
rape, and can do so by enacting appropriate legislation that
achieves that goal.
APPENDIX I
Termination of Parental Rights in a Case of an Allegation
That a Child was Conceived as a Result of Rape.
(1) The General Assembly recognizes that certain victims of
rape may conceive a child as a result of rape and choose to bear
and raise the child. The General Assembly also recognizes that
victims of rape who have elected to raise a child born as a result
of that rape, as well as the child, may suffer serious emotional
or physical harm if the perpetrator is granted parental rights
over that child. The General Assembly hereby declares that the
purpose of this statute is to protect such persons where it is
determined that the petitioner is a victim of rape but in which
no conviction occurred and to protect a child conceived as a
305. See supra Part VI.B.1.a.
306. See supra Part VI.B.1.b.
307. See supra Parts VI.B.1.a– VI.B.1.b.
308. See supra Part III.A.1.
309. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
310. Compare supra note 212 (identifying states that require proof of
conviction to terminate parental rights) with supra note 225 (identifying states
that do not require proof of conviction to terminate parental rights).
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result of that rape. The General Assembly further declares that
the purpose of this statute is to create a process to seek
termination of the parental rights of the perpetrator and
prevent future contact between the parties through use of
protective orders. The General Assembly further declares that
this section creates civil remedies aimed at protecting the
interests of the petitioner and the child and is not created to
punish the perpetrator.
(2) As used in this section:
a. “Parental rights” has the same meaning as defined in
Section 20-124.1.311
b. “Petitioner” means a person who alleges that they are a
victim of sexual assault and who files a petition for termination
of the parental rights of the other parent as provided in this
section.
c. “Respondent” means a person against whom a petition for
termination of parental rights is filed as provided in this section.
d. “Rape” has the same meaning as defined in
Section 18.2-61.312
(3) The person who alleges that they are a victim of rape
and who alleges that a child was conceived as a result of that
rape in which a conviction did not occur may file a petition at
any time in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
to prevent future contact with the parent who allegedly
committed the rape and to terminate the parental rights of the
parent who allegedly committed the rape.
(4) The verified petition filed under this section must allege
that:
a. The respondent committed an act of rape against the
petitioner;
b. The respondent has not been convicted of rape;
c. A child was conceived as a result of the act of rape as
described under paragraph (a) of this subsection (4); and
d. Termination of the parental rights of the respondent is
in the best interests of the child.
(5) After a petition has been filed pursuant to this section,
the court shall issue a summons that briefly recites the

311. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2021) (defining legal and physical
custody).
312. See id. § 18.2-61 (defining rape).
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substance of the petition and contains a statement that the
purpose of the proceeding is to determine whether to terminate
the parental rights of the respondent.
(6) The petitioner shall have the respondent personally
served with a copy of the summons or notified through
substitute service pursuant to Section 8.01-296,313 unless the
respondent appears voluntarily or waives service pursuant to
Section 8.01-286.314 Upon request, the court shall protect the
whereabouts of the petitioner and the child and must identify
the petitioner and the child in the summons by initials.
(7) After a petition has been filed, the court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem, who must be an attorney, to represent the
child’s best interests in the proceeding. If at any time the court
determines that the guardian ad litem is no longer necessary,
the court may discharge the guardian ad litem.
(8) The petitioner and the respondent have a right to be
represented by legal counsel in proceedings conducted under
this section.
(9) In any proceeding held under this section, the court may
grant protective measures as requested by the petitioner so long
as these measures do not violate due process. The petitioner’s
and the child’s whereabouts must be kept confidential.
(10) A respondent may admit parentage or may request
genetic testing to confirm paternity. The results of genetic
testing must conform to the admissibility provisions of
Section 20-49.3.315
(11) The court shall terminate the parental rights of the
respondent if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that:
a. A rape against the petitioner occurred;
b. The rape was perpetrated by the respondent;
c. A child was conceived as a result of that act of rape as
evidenced by the respondent admitting parentage or genetic
testing establishing the paternity; and
d. Termination of the parental rights of the respondent is
in the best interests of the child. The court shall not presume
313. See id. § 8.01-296(2) (stating the alternative means of service upon
natural persons).
314. See id. § 8.01-286 (outlining how a respondent may waive service).
315. See id. § 20-493 (outlining the procedures required when using
genetic tests to determine parentage).
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that having only one remaining parent is contrary to the child’s
best interests.
(12) A respondent whose parental rights are terminated in
accordance with this section has:
a. No right to allocation of parental responsibilities,
including visitation and decision-making responsibilities for the
child, which includes medical treatment, religious, educational,
or any other decisions on behalf of the child;
b. No right of inheritance from the child; and
c. No right to notification of, or standing to object to, the
adoption of the child.
Termination of parental rights under subsection (11) of this
section does not relieve the respondent of any obligation to pay
child support or birth-related costs unless waived by the
petitioner. In cases where child support obligations are not
waived, the court, as informed by the wishes of the petitioner,
shall determine if entering an order to pay child support is in
the best interests of the child. If the court orders the respondent
to pay child support, the court shall order the payments to be
made through the Department of Social Security to avoid the
need for any contact between the parties and to protect the
whereabouts and privacy of the petitioner and the child.

